

Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Prison and probation
interventions

Radicalisation Awareness Network



2017 Edition

Table of content

Contents

Table of content	2
1. General description	3
2. Aims	4
3. Methods	4
4. Lessons learned	6
.4.1 Multi-agency approach in view of rehabilitation.....	6
.4.2 Prison regimes	6
.4.3 Healthy prison environment	7
.4.4 Prison and probation staff training.....	7
.4.5 Barriers to reintegration	7
5. Practices	8
.5.1 Social Net Conferencing.....	9
.5.2 Team TER (Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals)	11
.5.3 Inclusion.....	13
.5.4 Information Management to prevent radical escalation.....	16
.5.5 Identification of violent extremism and radicalisation in Finnish prisons.....	19
.5.6 Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2-revised (VERA-2R) Pressman, Rinne, Duits, Flockton (2016).....	22

1. General description

Practitioners and policy-makers are under immense political and public pressure to ensure public safety in light of the public reaction to terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere. This is particularly apposite in relation to violent extremist offenders (VEOs), a group which includes terrorists and others considered at risk of engaging in violent extremism in a prison and probation context. Since the launch of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2012, the Prison and Probation (RAN P&P) Working Group has focused on preventing violent extremism, engagement with extremist groups and extremist behaviour during detention and probation.

However, since 2012, the context of terrorism has changed dramatically for prisons and probation, with foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) now constituting the chief perceived threat to security in Europe. According to Europol, the largest proportion of arrests in the EU over the past three years ⁽¹⁾ is represented by Jihadist terrorism and foreign fighters, while ethno-nationalist, separatist, left-wing and anarchist terrorism threats have dwindled. Moreover, concerns over right-wing extremism are growing.

This complex situation is reflected in prison and probation environments: practitioners have a responsibility to keep prisons - and the public domain - safe from terrorist activity, and must also deal with individuals at risk of radicalisation. Based on practitioners' experiences collated in the P&P Practitioners' Working Paper ⁽²⁾, RAN P&P has developed an approach to prison and probation interventions.

The RAN P&P principles ⁽³⁾ guiding this approach are as follows:

- promoting offenders' well-being and rehabilitation is the way to best ensure safety for society;
- terrorism crimes apply to a range of activities; individuals sentenced for terrorist acts do not all pose the same risk to society;
- offenders are capable of positive change, and they need support when disengaging from violent extremism;
- universal human rights must be upheld at all times and under all circumstances;
- promoting positive staff-prisoner relationships and healthy prison settings is necessary if radicalisation risk is to be reduced, and rehabilitation and reintegration stimulated;
- multi-agency cooperation is crucial in preventing radicalisation and supporting desistance processes.

⁽¹⁾ Europol. (2016). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat)* (p.18) The Hague: European Union.

⁽²⁾ Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence. (2016). RAN P&P Practitioners' working paper 'Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation'. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_approaches_to_violent_extremist_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence. (2016). RAN P&P Practitioners' working paper 'Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation'. (p. 2). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_approaches_to_violent_extremist_en.pdf

2. Aims

The aim of prison and probation interventions is twofold: to ensure security and safety (for the offender(s) in question, staff, other offenders and society at large), and to support offender rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

There are diverse types of offenders, including individuals who have not committed acts of violence and may never do so. Being radical does not necessarily entail violent action. Any response to radicalisation must acknowledge this diversity. We also recognise that effective management of VEOs and those considered at risk of radicalisation calls for multi-agency cooperation. It is crucial that offenders receive continuous support and that information be exchanged between organisations, including prison and probation services, police, and community organisations.

In pursuing the general aims of safety and rehabilitation, at least three key elements should be taken into account.

- A range of activities are now considered terrorism offences, many of which are non-violent and therefore pose a limited risk to society. 'Lesser risks' include those associated with fundraising, the intention to travel or possession of material considered extremist. The response to such risks should be proportionate, since disproportionate measures may fuel radicalisation processes.
- With some VEOs receiving short sentences, criminal justice systems have a limited window of opportunity in which to affect the process of change. For this reason, continuity is crucial for individuals leaving prison for the community, and multi-agency cooperation is paramount as needs are assessed. Probation services can also help design alternatives to prison rehabilitation.
- In light of the different types of offenders and the varied associated risks and needs, specialised programmes might be considered, although decision-making should be informed by the contextual and individual circumstances.

3. Methods

Member States hold at least two approaches towards VEOs, and these apply to both prison and probation.

- General approach: Member States adopting this approach tend to normalise the risk associated with VEOs and radicalisation, through a rehabilitation approach not tailored to the group (although it might be tailored to the individual).
- Specialist approach: Member States adopting specialised approaches believe the risks call for special structures and/or processes. The offenders' individual circumstances are the defining criteria that determine whether a specialist approach is required.

In terms of security and safety, the following interventions and methods are in use.

- General monitoring, which is linked predominantly to intelligence gathering. If considered relevant, information is collected, analysed and reported. General monitoring has the advantage of individualising decision-making, as information-gathering targets specific individuals. However, its disadvantage lies in the subjective judgement on which the decision-making is based, which increases the risk of false positives; also, there is a low level of risk acceptance of radicalised individuals. To offset this disadvantage, many Member States use risk assessment tools.
- Risk assessment tools have been developed in an attempt to prevent the formation of subjective judgement based on information gathered through monitoring, and thus provide a 'statistical' foundation for the decision-making process. However, these tools are under development and are still in their infancy. There is also a risk that these tools might be used in a predictive way:

adverse effects include labelling individuals as 'extremists', contributing to alienation and potentially decreasing the legitimacy (fairness) of the prison (4). Therefore, it is important to use specialised tools alongside other more general risk and need assessment tools. In both cases, it is vital that risks be assessed regularly, to ensure that individuals have the possibility of lowering their risk.

- Prison regimes is another method used to ensure safety and security objectives. VEOs placed in the prison infrastructure fall under certain regimes, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Advantages and disadvantages of regime choice

Regime choice	Potential advantages	Potential disadvantages
Containment Placing VEOs together in a special wing/unit within the prison	-Close monitoring -Limited effect on mainstream population -Focused interventions -Specialised staff -Reassuring for public safety concerns	-New and stronger bonds forged among prisoners -Eroded trust between staff and prisoners -Entrenched oppositional mindset -Perceptions of unfairness reinforced -Labelling effects; stigmatisation -Status associated with being on a special unit -All VEOs assumed to be of equal risk -Difficulties finding staff -High financial cost
Dispersal Dispersing VEOs within the 'regular' prison population, based on risk assessment	-Less stigmatisation and marginalisation -No status derived from placement on special unit -Opportunities for positive influence from others	-General staff; training costs -Difficult to ensure high quality of intelligence -Challenges in 'knowing' prisoners and dynamic security -VEOs may exert influence over others -VEOs may be influenced by criminal gangs
Combination Having both containment and dispersal options available	-Tailor-made response to individual needs/risks	-Selection criteria/risk assessments are imprecise

VEO rehabilitation interventions and methods are as follows.

- Psychological care: although individual psychological sessions are more expensive and harder to finance, experience dictates that they also generate the best results. During group interventions,

(4) Liebling, A., & Williams, R. J. (in press). The new subversive geranium: Some notes on the management of additional troubles in maximum security prisons, *British Journal of Sociology*.

participants are often less 'honest', especially regarding their own situation and views. The potential disruption of group dynamics (e.g. charismatic radical 'leaders' who challenge facilitators) must also be taken into account.

- Religious and spiritual support: chaplaincy provisions can help with religious education and support, as well as challenge certain views and provide opportunities for detainees to consider issues differently. However, at times, care and guidance overlap with deradicalisation and preventive aims, for example when providing alternative theological perspectives. Therefore, chaplains involved in disengagement/deradicalisation efforts should be trained for this task.
- Social support: working with family and friends as partners in a disengagement process is effective if the social circle was not a factor in the radicalisation process in the first place. Interventions such as mentor projects can also be used to provide social support and help build trust-based relationships, for example with staff, community members and NGO professionals.

4. Lessons learned

.4.1 Multi-agency approach in view of rehabilitation

One of the principal lessons learned in prison and probation interventions is the importance of multi-agency approaches. A multi-agency approach is called for at several stages of the sentence. Given that the aim of any intervention is rehabilitation of the inmate, the approach must incorporate different fields of intervention.

Police and intelligence services are fundamental allies in the multi-agency approach, mainly thanks to their information-gathering. In some cases, prison administrations have developed intelligence units within the prisons.

Multi-agency cooperation is also very important during the transition period from prison to community: it maximises opportunities for offenders to have their needs accurately assessed and met. Part of post-release planning, this cooperation should involve a multidisciplinary team to cover individualised needs and risks, build trustful relationships and social networks, and offer support. In particular, it is key that positive relationships be developed to provide support, suggestions and help when needed: transitional periods are vulnerable times when the risk of recidivism is high, and having plans in place is vital.

.4.2 Prison regimes

In terms of choice of prison regimes, the lessons learned are both limited and general, as circumstances vary greatly among Member States. Key recommendations included in the P&P Practitioners' Working Paper include the following.

- Prison regime choices should be guided by the aim to normalise VEOs whilst minimising risks to the VEOs themselves, other prisoners, staff and the general public.
- The pros and cons of different prison regime models for managing the risks around radicalisation must be carefully considered alongside the individual needs of offenders. For prisoners demonstrating behaviour of concern linked to radicalisation, special units might be necessary, but their use must be guided by clear entrance and exit criteria, and they must operate within the legal frameworks of the country concerned.
- Differentiation within special units is important for tailoring security and rehabilitation efforts to different levels of risk and need, in relation to the level of the offence and the individual's gender and ideological background.

.4.3 Healthy prison environment

A healthy prison environment can also make a positive difference in staging a successful disengagement intervention. Indeed, the risks of radicalisation are reduced in professional, secure and fair prisons. The absence of these elements can reinforce extremist mindsets and distrust towards authorities, and increase the chances of formation of groups and triggers for violence. Investing in day-to-day staff-offender relationships, through staff empowerment, professionalism, respect and dynamic security measures, is key to dealing with VEOs.

- **Staff-prisoner relationship:** a good VEO-staff relationship can help build trust and break down 'us' versus 'them' barriers and the distrust and suspicion towards 'the authorities' often held by extremist individuals.
- **Personal development:** vocational training is important, not only for the personal development of prisoners, but also to minimise distress. Developing personal skills might also facilitate the transition period once the inmate is released.
- **Conditions and family contact:** family contact is a crucial form of support for prisoners, and contributes to the formation of healthy relationships after release. Frequency of contact with family, a meaningful space for visits that includes comfortable child-friendly areas, and an appropriate time allocated for meaningful contact are all important. Family bonds can be a positive driving force for rehabilitation.
- **Security, safety and control:** a lack of structure and inconsistencies in security and control can negatively impact prisoners' experiences, and safety needs may be met through other means, including groups (e.g. religious or gang-like groups) that offer protection.
- **Professionalism:** professional discretion should be exercised to ensure that punitive practices are enforced only when other options have been exhausted. Staff should communicate clearly with prisoners so that they understand why disciplinary actions are being taken and what behaviour needs addressing. Professionalism entails equal treatment of VEOs and other offenders.

.4.4 Prison and probation staff training

A useful lesson learned from Member States' experiences is to set up a national training and support unit for prison and probation staff that can help with dissemination of training material, development of better training practices and psychological support for staff. A national training unit at central level can also ensure harmonisation and standardisation of training materials, strengthen cooperation at local, national and international levels and facilitate the sharing of best practices and training material.

Another key element is to ensure that both general and specialist training are provided. General training should be made available to all staff, and specialist training is required for different staff roles and in relation to the prisoner population considered at risk. Staff training should include diversity awareness: staff must appreciate different cultural and religious backgrounds of prisoners if they are to distinguish between behaviours and practices potentially linked to radicalisation and those that are not. Staff should be trained to understand radicalisation as a process, as well as the individual, social and environmental reasons behind prisoners' behaviour. Staff must recognise the process, not just be on the lookout for 'signs'.

.4.5 Barriers to reintegration

Research has long established that offenders encounter significant difficulties (economic, relational and emotional, among others) in becoming 'requalified citizens' once released from prison. Individuals convicted of terrorist offences face additional barriers. There are unique sources of stigma associated with terrorist offences, and in some contexts, this negative label may be appropriated to serve as a status symbol in marginalised communities.

Stigmatisation: stigmatised offenders experience challenges in accessing social support and opportunities to reintegrate, including employment or education opportunities. Professionals working with VEOs must make a point of providing support to offenders as they seek to reintegrate. Offenders who feel they are the subject of prejudice may entrench barriers and reinforce oppositional and radicalised identities.

Trust: it is crucial that professionals work towards building and maintaining trust with offenders as well as with wider segments of the public. Distrust of communities or community organisations can reinforce perceptions of unfairness among community members. Member States' probation services (or their equivalent) can benefit from building strong relationships with community organisations. This ensures that multiple sectors of society maximise opportunities for offenders, post-release.

Release conditions: conditions can be quite strict for these offenders, more so than those for other types of offenders. This may hamper reintegration, if, for example, offenders are easily recalled to prison for breaches. Practitioners, however, may also utilise these conditions (and the more frequent contact they entail) as an opportunity to work closely with offenders and respond to their needs.

5. Practices

The following practices were represented:

- NEUSTART: social net conferencing
- Dutch Probation Service: team TER (Terrorists, Extremists, Radicals)
- Dutch Probation Service: inclusion
- Ministry of Justice in France: training of on-site referee trainers (ORT) on violent Islamist radicalisation awareness in detention
- Ministry of Justice in Italy: training courses on violent radicalisation and proselytism in prisons
- Criminal sanction agency and Vantaa prison: identification of violent extremism and radicalisation in Finnish prisons
- Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS): e-learning understanding and addressing extremism in prisons and probation
- SAZ Schweizerisches Ausbildungszentrum für das Strafvollzugspersonal: recognising radicalisation in prison
- Ministry of Justice in Austria: seminar and training for prison staff.
- The Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP)

Name of the practice	.5.1 <i>Social Net Conferencing</i>
Description	<p>Social net conferencing offers offenders in prison the chance to develop a mandatory plan for their future after their release. Offenders work together with their social net to create a plan. The plan is then sent to the judge, who issues orders according to the plan, at the trial. The probation officer supervises compliance with the orders and therefore also implementation of the plan.</p> <p>The method benefits radicalised individuals by helping them develop a plan covering daily life, work, housing and so on, alongside their social network and associated professionals. The social net conference is organised by one or two coordinators, who set up the meeting between radicalised individuals and their social nets. Under the social net conference and the plan developed, radicalised individuals are obliged to fulfil the conditions of the plan. Thus, the return of radicalised persons to radicalised environments can be prevented – initiating a change for the better.</p> <p>The probation officer participates in the conference and formulates the main concerns in terms of release and recidivism. The plan should address these concerns.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation Community engagement/empowerment
Target audience	Violent extremists, radicalized inmates Families Prison/probation/judicial practitioners
Deliverables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hofinger, V., & Schmidinger, T. (2017). Deradikalisierung im Gefängnis. Wien, Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology. Retrieved from http://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/Endbericht_Begleitforschung_2017.pdf - Grafl et al. (2014). Evaluationsstudie zum Projekt Sozialnetz-Konferenz in der Bewährungshilfe, Abschlussbericht.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>The studies mentioned above evaluate the method and include feedback from target groups (participants).</p> <p>Social net conferencing is part of the NEUSTART service, and therefore forms part of the quantitative data which NEUSTART deliver via the internal electronic documentation system.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	<p>To transfer the practice, it is important to get the Ministry of Justice on board, to ensure that the social net conferences can be held in prison. Cases for social net conferences are assigned by judges. The coordinators organising the conference are trained in workshops and seminars, and also by other coordinators already experienced in applying the method.</p> <p>NEUSTART offers two different types of social net conferences: those held in pretrial custody and those held prior to release.</p> <p>For social net conferences in pretrial custody, offenders and the social network work on a plan, which will be presented to the judge at the trial. It should be an additional basis for decision-making on the sentence.</p> <p>One coordinator organises this type of conference, and is granted 8 hours working time per conference.</p>

	For social net conferences prior to release, offenders and the social network prepare a plan, which will be presented to the judge who determines the parole. This type of conference is organised by two coordinators; in addition to the social net conference, a follow-up conference is held 6 months later. In the follow-up, offenders and participants discuss the status of the plan, and analyse what works and what does not work in implementing the plan.
Geographical scope	Austria
Start of the practice	2014 – it is in practice and is defined by the Juvenile Code.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	P&P working group, Riga, December 2016
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	NEUSTART is a non-profit organisation, set up as an association, funded by the Ministry of Justice, Austria. Probation services in Austria are offered by NEUSTART. In addition, NEUSTART offers social work services in the fields of electronic home detention, victim-offender mediation, after-care services and community services. Since 2014, NEUSTART has also offered social net conferences, and therefore this method also forms part of the Ministry of Justice financing.
Country of origin	Austria
Contact details	Castelligasse 17 1050 Wien Bernd Glaeser bernd.glaeser@neustart.at +43 154595601201 http://www.neustart.at/at/en/

Name of the practice	.5.2 <i>Team TER (Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals)</i>
Description	<p>With the nationally operating Team TER (Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals), the Dutch Probation Service helps prevent (further) radicalisation by Dutch probationers. It aims chiefly to disengage radicalised Muslims (mainly home-grown jihadi) from radical movements with a tailor-made probation approach, and to influence their behaviour. Push and pull factors are used to promote behavioural change and stimulate the process of reintegration into society. The main tasks are risk management and supervision, carried out in close cooperation with partners (judicial, prison, police and municipal authorities). The team is also supported by psychological and theological experts.</p> <p>The Dutch Probation Service engages with persons suspected or convicted of terrorism-related offenses such as rioting, recruiting and financing. Individuals suspected or convicted of offences like attempting to travel to or return from conflict areas or preparing an attack are referred to Team TER. In addition, Team TER addresses individuals who are suspected or convicted of other offences but are known to be involved in radicalisation- or terrorist-related risks.</p> <p>The team comprises 13 (internationally) trained probation officers specialised in relevant fields. They use regular probation methods of working in a judicial framework with mandated clients and make cognitive behavioural interventions.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Violent extremists
Deliverables	There is a factsheet available (in Dutch), with brief information on Team TER for stakeholders.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>Team TER is a learning community that is developing its own approach. The shared tacit knowledge of probation officers forms one of the main sources. Where there is insufficient expertise or need for additional knowledge, extra support is sought. International cooperation is needed to assess whether treatment programmes are suitable for application in the Netherlands. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the target group presents diverse problems, and therefore, tailor-made interventions per individual are necessary.</p> <p>The involvement of science and education in this field of study and the translation into concrete methods applicable to the Dutch context (cultural, but also legislative and regulatory) are desirable. Of course, this also means that international research and expertise are employed by Team TER, and can be exchanged with other probation organisations.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	We have plans to modify the methods of Team TER to accommodate the scope of broader groups of extremists (right-wing

	<p>militants, anti-government ‘patriot’ groups, eco- and pro-animal radicals, etc.). A scientific article for a peer-reviewed journal and a chapter in the Dutch probation method book are in preparation .</p> <p>To evaluate the extent to which this programme has succeeded in achieving its goals, Leiden University was asked to map the progress of the project in February 2013 and February 2014.</p> <p>(Schuurman, B., & Bakker, E. (2016). Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013-2014. <i>Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression</i>, 8(1), 66-85. doi:10.1080/19434472.2015.1100648).</p> <p>A follow-up of this study is being carried out over the period of January 2016 and December 2017.</p>
Geographical scope	Netherlands
Start of the practice	Team TER was set up in 2012 with the development of the Dutch Approach.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	RAN P&P, 14-15 June 2016, Berlin Exit programmes and interventions in prison and probation
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	<p>The Dutch Probation Service is an independent organisation with the primary goal of shaping a safer society. The Probation Service is actively involved in the criminal justice process; when an offender is detained, it plays an advisory and supervisory role during the court session and the detention period. Judicial, municipal, prison and police authorities cooperate to prevent offenders from reoffending.</p> <p>Probation workers provide advisory services to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Judiciary, supervise conditional sanctions and measures, and implement alternative sanctions (e.g. community services). Dutch detainees abroad receive assistance from the International Office of the Dutch Probation Service. In supervision, probation workers continually monitor whether offenders are honouring the agreements made. In cognitive behavioural training, offenders’ motivation is increased, prosocial choices are encouraged and self-reflection is stimulated, so that behavioural change can be established.</p>
Country of origin	Netherlands
Contact details	<p>Reclassering Nederland Vivaldiplantsoen 100 3503 RE UTRECHT</p> <p>Ada Andreas a.andreas@reclassering.nl +31 888042004 +31 651040081</p> <p>https://www.reclassering.nl</p>

Name of the practice	.5.3 <i>Inclusion</i>
Description	<p>Inclusion is inspired by two existing programmes: EXIT Sweden and the Dutch cognitive behavioural programme Solo. We used the elements of each programme that appeared best suited to our target group. The key element of Solo is the participation of a so-called significant other (SO) in the reintegration process, while EXIT Sweden focuses on building a new identity outside the extremist network.</p> <p>Inclusion is an individualised, tailor-made programme that is elaborated during probation supervision. Inclusion's chief aim of is to disengage radicalised Muslims (mainly home-grown jihadi) from radical movements.</p> <p>It consists of three modules.</p> <p>1. Practical help</p> <p>In the first stage of Inclusion, the trainer alone provides practical help. The participant draws a Plan for the Future, in which he or she defines goals. For instance, there may be housing, employment, or debt problems to be tackled. By meeting the material needs of the participant, the trainer gains their trust and establishes a working alliance. The participant learns new skills to boost their self-confidence. This will broaden the participant's perspective and provide an opportunity to move away from the radical environment.</p> <p>2. Network approach</p> <p>At the same time, trainer and participant map the network of the participant: is there anyone in the former prosocial network (teacher, imam or friend, for instance) that the participant wants to get in touch with? If so, contact is made, and this SO then assists the participant with hands-on activities. If there is no SO available in the network, Inclusion provides a volunteer.</p> <p>The trainer also encourages participants to repair relations with a friend or family member, with support from the SO. Consultations can also be arranged with religious experts, e.g. an imam. By degrees, the participant is introduced into and included in society by expanding his network. The trainer continues to build a trusting relationship, and motivates the participant to achieve (behavioural) change.</p> <p>3. Cognitive behavioural training</p> <p>If the participant starts to use the 'language of change', Module 3 is launched. This involves nine categories of cognitive behavioural exercises:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • thinking patterns/attitude/behaviour • impulsivity • anger/frustration tolerance • locus of control • identity/vulnerability

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coping • (universal) values • (religious) meaning • social skills. <p>The trainer selects the themes that play a role in the life of the participant. If agreed by the participant, the SO may participate.</p> <p>In June 2017, Inclusion is to be tested by trained members of the Terrorists, Extremists and Radicals (TER) team of the Dutch Probation Service.</p>
Approach	Prison and Probation Exit strategies
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Violent extremists First responders or practitioners
Deliverables	In 2016, the programme Manual of Inclusion was completed. We also produced a Working Book that includes the required training materials (URLs, pictures, puzzles, etc.). There is also a Factsheet available (in Dutch), containing brief information on Inclusion for our stakeholders.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>Inclusion is being developed in close cooperation with the TER team. Dutch experts were consulted, and extensive desk research carried out. Feedback was submitted continually in earlier versions of the programme.</p> <p>Although Inclusion is a new initiative, it is derived from two programmes that have theoretical bases (for literature on Solo, see Robinson (2007), Priestley & VanStone (2006) and Hankinson & Priestley (2010); for literature on EXIT Sweden, see Christensen (2015)). In assessing whether the programme structure of Inclusion is effective for radicalised Muslims, several questions need to be addressed:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Does the trainer succeed in building a trustful relationship with the participant? 2. Do the practical activities lead to increased community engagement? 3. Does the network approach lead to an improved relationship with a family member or friend? 4. Is the SO of additional value? 5. Do the exercises in Module 3 have a positive impact on the cognitive deficits of the target group? <p>In July 2017, we will conduct a pilot study to research the questions mentioned above. If Inclusion is positively evaluated, we will submit the programme to the Judicial Interventions Dutch Accreditation Panel in 2018. We are striving for a First Degree accreditation, i.e. 'Theoretically well grounded.'</p>
Sustainability and transferability	We have plans to modify Inclusion to accommodate the scope of broader groups of extremists (right-wing militants, anti-government 'patriot' groups, eco- and pro-animal radicals, etc.). Inclusion is originally designed for an ambulant setting (probation). If the

	programme is positively evaluated, it could be made suitable for the Terrorism Wings of the Dutch Prisons.
Geographical scope	Netherlands
Start of the practice	We will start with Inclusion in July 2017.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	We discussed Inclusion at the IMPACT-RAN workshop, on 10 and 11 November 2016. The workshop was held in Cambridge in support of training on how to elaborate the evaluation of radicalisation interventions.
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	<p>The Dutch Probation Service is an independent organisation with the primary goal of shaping a safer society. The Probation Service is actively involved in the criminal justice process; when an offender is detained, it plays an advisory and supervisory role during the court session and the detention period. Judicial, municipal, prison and police authorities cooperate to prevent offenders from reoffending.</p> <p>Probation workers provide advisory services to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Judiciary, supervise conditional sanctions and measures, and implement alternative sanctions (e.g. community services). Dutch detainees abroad receive assistance from the International Office of the Dutch Probation Service.</p> <p>In supervision, probation workers continually monitor whether offenders are honouring the agreements made. In cognitive behavioural training, offenders' motivation is increased, prosocial choices are encouraged and self-reflection is stimulated, so that behavioural change can be established.</p>
Country of origin	Netherlands
Contact details	<p>Reclassering Nederland Vivaldiplantsoen 100 3503 RE UTRECHT</p> <p>Dr Renée Henskens r.henskens@reclassering.nl +31 888042058</p> <p>https://www.reclassering.nl/</p>

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.4 <i>Information Management to prevent radical escalation</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>This Italian approach can be seen as combining three parallel elements: 1) security and 2) rehabilitation, framed under the umbrella of the 3) rule of law (represented by surveillance judges and courts). Respect for the different duties, responsibilities and functions of the penitentiary police, as well as the rehabilitation bodies (educators, psychologists, experts, etc.) under the supervision of surveillance judges, grants an appropriate level of independency, equality, proportionality, and complementarity to counter-radicalisation policies This limits as far as possible administrative decisions on matters concerning the rights of inmates and their equality before the law, regardless of the religion, faith or ideology they profess.</p> <p>To ensure information gathered within the Italian Prisons is analysed efficiently, a Central Unit for Investigations (Nucleo Investigativo Centrale, NIC) within the Ministry of Justice-Department for Prison Administration, Office of the Head of the Department, has the task of centralising all information collected from local branches and analysing it in relation to particularly serious crimes, such as organised crime, international and domestic terrorism and any threat to public security. The monitoring is based on three levels of classification: 1. High - Monitoring; 2. Medium - <i>Attenzionamento</i> (from the Italian word for ‘attention’); 3. Low - Reporting.</p> <p>The analysis conducted by the NIC on the radical and terrorist subjects, shared with the National Prosecutor Office to Counter Mafia and Terrorism and the General Direction for Treatment, is then channelled to the CASA. (Committee of Counter Terrorism Strategic Analysis). CASA was established in 2004 by a Decree from the Ministry of Interior as part of the National Plan to Counter Terrorism, within the framework of the Crisis Unit (Decree 83/2002). The Committee brings together all four law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the intelligence services (in particular DIS, departments of internal-AISI- and external security- AISE) under the premises of the Central Office of Preventive Police (Ministry of Interior). The group meets on a weekly basis to share information and to analyse data before composing specific and detailed risk analyses. Combined with the NIC’s investigative efforts, this analysis centre makes it possible to match information from within Italy with information coming from other sources and countries, and to provide LEAs with an appropriate level of information at local level.</p> <p>The following principles are central to the monitoring activities carried out by the Italian authorities for radical inmates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The flow of behavioural, non-forensic and non-judiciary information is kept separate from the treatment element: the two elements are complementary but do not influence each other, because all prisoners are equal in front of the law and have the right to access the same services. In line with the L.354/75, only surveillance judges can approve and modify rehabilitation programmes, not LEAs or intelligence services. • To this end, data from monitoring are only gathered, used and shared with a preventive aim, from the security perspective. • The monitoring does not only cover critical events, but also the inmate’s daily routine, including fixed and codified procedures.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information and output from central analysis (by NIC or CASA) does not flow back to the local level, unless there is a request for closer monitoring. • All penitentiary staff have a duty to provide information concerning radical phenomena (non-forensic and non-judiciary data) from the prisons to the prison director, who will convey the information to the competent central offices. Conversely, information concerning potential crimes (forensic and judiciary information that form the basis for investigations) are transmitted by the judiciary police department of the penitentiary police to the competent judiciary authorities. • To conclude, the key to the system is understanding correctly the interaction between different pieces of information coming from the several information flows, but within the framework of the Italian constitutional architecture. It is also crucial to balance fundamental rights with security through by respecting different roles and competences.
Approach	Prison and Probation
Target audience	Prison/probation/judicial practitioners
Deliverables	<p>Several procedures are in place to ensure coherence and consistency in the management of information:</p> <p>D.1 ‘Situation Room’: Created in 2003, the so-called ‘situational room’ is a cyber link, also in form of an application, connecting the periphery and the centre, with the main aim of registering all critical events. These include non-forensic and non-judiciary data coming from the prison observation, through to information received from the local penitentiary institutions, conveyed and analysed in real-time at central level. As events have evolved, a special category has been created for critical events linked to proselytism and radicalisation.</p> <p>D.2 Modification of Indicators: With letter GDAP 0248805/2016, the Department of Prison Administration simplified its previous system based on classical ‘indicators of radicalisation’ as foreseen in the old EU ‘Manual on Violent Radicalisation. The new strategy focuses mostly on two main indicators: ‘change’ and ‘isolation’, and requires the proactive participation of all prison staff (GDAP 385582/2015);</p> <p>D.3 Integration of observation with ICT Tools: Periodic behavioural reports for inmates under the radar for radicalisation, are managed through the system SIAP/AFIS 2.0. They connect local and central levels. Requests concerning the level of classification of inmates from external administration (DIGOS, ROS, etc.) need to be authorised by the Judiciary Authority, but are also available through the backdoor of SIDET WEB 2, available for both, MoJ and MoI;</p> <p>D.4 Training www.traininghermes.eu: An online training platform, jointly developed by the Italian, Latvian and Romanian Ministries of Justice, in cooperation with Hochschule für den öffentlichen Dienst in Bayern, Guardia Civil, Spain, and Agenfor International, is available to train all staff on different aspects of radical phenomena within prisons and probation. The LMS contains seven modules for blended delivery and a complete manual.</p>
Evidence and evaluation	Key Indicator 1: Number of Attacks and Casualties:

	<p>Italy has approximately 54 000 inmates, among them 18 000 third country nationals (corresponding to 34 % of the prison population). Some 11 000 inmates come from mainstreaming Muslim countries. Although this is a critical situation, aggravated by logistical and financial problems, Italy has not registered any attack or damage caused by religiously-inspired terrorists;</p> <p>Key Indicator 2: Administrative prevention measures Thanks to the multi-agency information system, several administrative preventive measures have been adopted by the Italian Ministry of Interior, which led to the expulsion of 147 individuals.</p> <p>Key Indicator 3: Equal Rights Thanks to the separation between ‘intelligence-led’ activities, on one side, and rehabilitation programmes in line with art.15 of Penitentiary Law, under the jurisdiction of surveillance judges, on the other, about 30 % of the inmates under observation for radical behaviour are engaged with social cooperatives, participate in training courses and / or laboratories (cooking, editing, IT, gardening, crafts, tailoring, acting, maintenance). About 30 % participate in school courses (elementary, post-elementary and high school); 40 % are assigned in rotation to jobs managed by the Penitentiary Administration. About 10% do not participate in rehabilitative activities⁵.</p> <p>The recidivism rate for those inmates under observation for radical behaviour who follow standard rehabilitation programmes has decreased by approximately 50 %.</p>
Sustainability and transferability	The practice, or part of it, including specific deliverables, can be transferred to all countries in which the juridical architecture foresees a relevant role for the judiciary as part of prison surveillance.
Geographical scope	The practice is implemented in Italy and the indicators are taken from the Triveneto Administration, covering three Italian regions: Veneto, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli Venezia Giulia
Start of the practice	May 2004
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	The practice was reviewed during the RAN Study Visit on 26-27 October 2016 to Padova and Venice, and then during the RAN P&P Meeting in Riga.
Relation to other EC initiatives	MindB4Act, Derad, Training Aid, ISDEP
Organisation	The Penitentiary Administration, part of the Ministry of Justice.
Country of origin	Italy
Contact details	<p>Ufficio ispettivo e del controllo, Dipartimento Amministrazione Penitenziaria</p> <p>ufficioattivaitaispettivacontrollo.dap@giustizia.it</p> <p>+39 (0) 666592336/7</p>

⁵ percentage >100% depends from the fact that a number of inmates are employed in more than one activity at the same time and only a small percentage

Name of the practice	.5.5 <i>Identification of violent extremism and radicalisation in Finnish prisons</i>
Description	<p>The aim of this practice is to detect and identify radicalisation among the prison population:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • early detection prevents radicalisation processes and helps to identify individuals at risk; • includes prison term planning, risk assessment and safe placements; • enables the efficient collection of imprisonment information; • allows cooperation across different networks, and information exchange within the correctional institution and with other actors; • provides prison and probation staff training.
Approach	<p>Prison and probation</p> <p>Training for first-line practitioners</p>
Target audience	<p>Prison/probation/judicial practitioners</p> <p>First responders or practitioners</p> <p>Law enforcement officers</p>
Deliverables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommended practices for the Finnish Criminal Sanctions Agency, a prison and probation organisation. Guidelines for managing violent extremism and radicalisation in prisons. • Staff training. • A form for staff to use to identify violent extremism.
Evidence and evaluation	<p>Number of identified offenders:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • working methods and staff training to identify the phenomenon and individuals at risk; • information gathering enables better risk assessments; • detected prisoners can be guided to support and exit facilities; • in first 9 months of the project, we detected 72 prisoners with links to violent extremism and radicalisation, including religion-based extremism and political-based extremism; • only 2 of those prisoners were related to terrorism (remand prisoners, refugees from Syria/Iraq). <p>Placement decisions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • detection and gathered information has resulted in changes to many decisions on safety placements for prisoners with links to violent extremism and radicalisation; • with safe placement decisions, organisations can respond to prisoners' individual needs during imprisonment. <p>Number of trained staff:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in the first 9 months of the project, we were able to train Finnish Criminal Sanctions Agency staff of 11 prisons, 7 prison intelligence

	<p>units, 7 probation offices, 4 evaluation centres, 1 psychiatric prison hospital and 1 prison hospital: estimated at more than 200 officials including prison officers, prison management, prison social workers, nursing staff, psychologists and pastors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • feedback from training and lectures has been entirely positive, and staff members have been highly motivated to participate in training.
Sustainability and transferability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Application of project policies in countries other than Finland requires compatibility with existing legislation. • Project workers can provide lectures on the topic. • Programme costs depend on the scope of the targeted group.
Geographical scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training for the practices has been provided and they have been introduced throughout Finland. • The programme establishes definitive actions for the whole Finnish criminal sanctions agency organisation.
Start of the practice	1 August 2016. The project will run until 28 February 2018.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IMPACT Europe – Radicalisation Awareness Network Training Event • 10-11 November 2016, Cambridge (UK) • Countering violent extremism, interventions, evaluation
Relation to other EC initiatives	None
Organisation	<p>The Criminal Sanctions Agency is a governmental organisation comprising a Central Administration Unit, three criminal sanctions regions in Finland and an Enforcement Unit. The Training Institute for Prison and Probation Services is also part of the agency.</p> <p>The Criminal Sanctions Agency has 26 prisons. Prisoners serve their sentence either in a closed prison (70 %) or in an open institution (30 %). Prisoners considered more likely to adapt to freer conditions than to conditions in closed prisons are placed in open institutions.</p> <p>Vantaa prison Vantaa Prison was established in 2002; it carries out pretrial detention and transports prisoners.</p> <p>The prison has 185 prison places. More than 9 000 prison transportations were carried out in Vantaa prison in 2011. The average number of prisoners in 2015 was 205. It also has a Unit of the Psychiatric Prison Hospital.</p> <p>Personnel and activities Vantaa Prison employs about 140 people. The prison has profiled its activities, particularly raising motivation for prisoners, reducing drug abuse and training for imprisonment.</p> <p>The project for identifying violent extremism and prison radicalisation was based in Vantaa prison.</p> <p>Project financing Provided by the Criminal Sanctions Agency central administration.</p>

Country of origin	Finland
Contact details	Siltaniitynkuja 2 01260 Vantaa Finland Jouni Holappa jouni.holappa@om.fi +35 8504325798 http://www.rikosseuraamus.fi/en/index/units/prisons/vantaaprisson.html

<p>Name of the practice</p>	<p>.5.6 <i>Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2-revised (VERA-2R) Pressman, Rinne, Duits, Flockton (2016)</i></p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2-Revised (VERA-2R), is specifically designed, via the structured professional judgment (SPJ) approach, to analyse the risk of violent extremism. The first VERA was developed in 2009 and arose from the increasing need to assess the danger and risk posed by ideologically motivated violent individuals. Existing risk-assessment instruments, used to assess risk factors associated with common forms of individual violence, were not – and are still not – sensitive to known characteristics of terrorists and violent extremists.</p> <p>The first VERA was introduced by Pressman. The indicators used in the protocol were based on existing knowledge of violent extremists and terrorists, and were integrated into a structured professional judgment methodology. VERA was introduced by Pressman as a consultative approach. Following feedback from terrorism experts, national security analysts, and law enforcement operatives working on terrorism offences – as well as the application of VERA with convicted terrorists in high security prisons, VERA was revised as the VERA-2. Reliability and validity data (Pressman & Flockton, 2012) were also integrated.</p> <p>The current VERA-2R is a revised and enhanced version of the VERA-2, made possible through literature research. VERA-2R uses more specified dynamic indicators known to be consistent with the radicalisation process to violent extremism. The status of these risk indicators and risk-mitigating indicators can change over time at an individual level. The monitoring of these indicators at successive points in time permits the establishment of risk trajectories that are crucial for assessing, increasing or decreasing risk at an individual level.</p> <p>VERA-2R can be used as a supplementary approach by psychologists and psychiatrists with knowledge of violent extremism. It can also be used by analysts of security and intelligence services, forensic social workers, including social rehabilitation professionals, and police forces or others tasked with assessing people suspected of violent extremist or terrorist criminal offences. Users must be trained in the methodology and interpretation of VERA-2R before using it. They must also understand the role and effect of ideologies that justify the use of violence, of behavioural indicators and of the impact of digital and other communication systems. In addition, assessors should be familiar with the risk indicators relevant to violent extremism, the criterion definitions, and the advantages and limitations of the VERA-2R approach.</p> <p>VERA-2R contains 34 indicators specifically related to violent extremism. They are divided between five domains: Beliefs, attitudes and ideology; Social context and intention; History, action and capacity; Commitment and motivation; and Protective / risk-mitigating indicators. There are 31 additional indicators based on the scientific literature about general violence, radicalisation, jihadism and terrorism. They are divided between five domains: Criminal</p>

	<p>history; Personal history; Radicalization, Personality traits; and Psychiatric characteristics.</p> <p>The assessor should use all objective information available in rating the indicators. Each VERA-2R indicator has criteria for three levels of rating (low, medium, high), consistent with other SPJ risk-analysis instruments. For reasons of standardisation, the user must carefully read and apply the operationalisations for each of the three risk levels. The final professional judgment is based on the weighting of all available information and data related to the risk indicators. The final decision is <u>not</u> made based on a numerical overall score.</p>
Approach	Training for first line practitioners Prison and Probation
Target audience	Law enforcement officers Prison/probation/judicial practitioners Authorities
Deliverables	<p>The instrument is presented in an elaborate handbook. The handbook comprises an introduction to the subject, academic contributions, methodological guidelines and limitations, information on reliability and validity of the instrument, and of course the instrument itself. The instrument consists of an assessment form in which all indicators are clarified by lead-questions, operationalisations and scientific relevance.</p> <p>A standardised and two-day training course is required to use the instrument. Further requirements are frequent usage of the instrument and structural refresher days. For the Netherlands the training and refresher days are developed and organised by the NIFP.</p>
Evidence and evaluation	<p><u>Performance measures:</u> Concept validity and user-friendliness and content validity are continuously examined. Construct validity was measured with a group of convicted violent extremists matched to a group of violent, non-ideologically motivated offenders. VERA-2R, used in combination with a legal system that applies definitions in line with the risk indicators, demonstrates deductive validity. Predictive validity is very difficult to measure with risk assessment instruments.</p> <p>Security and law enforcement agency officers in many European, Asian and North American countries have been trained in VERA 2 and VERA-2R.</p> <p>In the Netherlands, risk-profiles of terrorist detainees are created based on the VERA-2R. It must be used by Dutch forensic psychiatrists and psychologists in pre-trial forensic mental health assessments. It is also used by the specialised Dutch Probation Service. It is evaluated positively by all of these professionals, as well as the Dutch national government. This evaluation has led to the policy decision to use VERA-2R analysis for every new prisoner charged with a terrorist offence.</p> <p><u>Evaluation and Feedback:</u> Since the publication of the original version of VERA in 2009, continuous feedback has been provided by psychologists and psychiatrists, analysts at national security and intelligence services, and law enforcement officers. Users are satisfied that the expert</p>

	<p>instrument is up to date. More than 90 % of those originally trained in its use have requested extra training for colleagues or other personnel. Implementation and refreshment meetings in the Netherlands show that the instrument is needed, relevant and usable.</p> <p><u>Peer review:</u> In 2013 an independent study of the validity and applicability of the VERA was published by researchers in the United Kingdom (Beardsley & Beech, 2013). They demonstrated that the VERA risk factors can be applied with the same accuracy to both terrorists operating independently and those operating in groups, independently of the spectrum of ideological motive. The research indicated that most of the operationalisation makes the VERA factors easily applicable. Moreover, VERA is a useful risk-assessment instrument for content validity and user validity. Beardsley and Beech (2013) also reported that the protective VERA items are also important for precise identification of extremists, and for identifying individuals who are less inclined to carry out terrorism in the future. They suggested that VERA-2R might be very useful in prisons where violent extremists are incarcerated, where the impact of programmes needs to be assessed, where decisions about early release need to be made, and where Countering Violence Extremism (CVE) programmes are required. Although further research is recommended, most of the elements in VERA are rated as ‘relevant and important for risk assessment’. The VERA-instrument is open for feedback and all feedback is used for continuous improvement.</p>
<p>Sustainability and transferability</p>	<p>Implementation experience in the Netherlands and implementation science shows that availability and usability of a risk assessment tool on violent extremism and training programmes can be ameliorated by adaptation to different judicial contexts.</p> <p>Implementation measures must therefore relate to understanding of identifying needs, interactions on best practices, assessing fits, and preparing organisations, staff and resources, before and during training, installation and implementation.</p> <p>The Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP) has obtained a Justice grant (August 2017) to introduce use and implementation of VERA-2R in 2017-2019 to the prison and probation services in six or more European Member States (Austria, France, Germany (Länder), Sweden, possibly Spain and Slovakia, in addition to Belgium and the Netherlands). The tool will be tailored to specific needs and uses. Exploration, training and implementation meetings with management and staff of European criminal justice agencies will take place.</p> <p>The NIFP will develop a standardised European database of convicted and deceased violent extremists and terrorists and their extremist acts. This database can be used to analyse and support the identification of the most critical risk factors of violent extremism, and risk specification for possible sub-groups of violent extremists and terrorists. This has relevance for effective policy and professional judicial practice related to potential violent extremists and terrorists. This will be done in cooperation with the department of conflict management of the University of Bielefeld, Germany and the prison service of Belgium.</p>

Geographical scope	<p>Officers of security, criminal justice agencies and law enforcement agencies in European, Asian and North American countries have been trained in using VERA 2 and VERA-2R. The instrument can be used to support European professional staff in these agencies.</p> <p>The instrument is being used and implemented in the Netherlands and Belgium within the criminal justice system (prison-terrorist wards, specialised probation service, specialised forensic mental health assessment, police).</p> <p>The NIFP will introduce use and implementation of VERA-2R in the prison and probation services of six or more European Member States, tailored to specific needs and uses.</p>
Start of the practice	<p>Development and implementation is an ongoing process in European countries. The first version of the VERA was developed in 2009, second in 2012, current VERA-2R in 2016. Training always precedes implementation. Implementation measures are now included. Implementation depends, among other factors, on organisational logistics. Two examples for the Netherlands:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summer 2016 was the starting point of the risk-profiles for terrorist detainees. That has led to structural implementation for all new terrorist detainees starting from January 2017. • The police, forensic psychologists / psychiatrists of the NIFP and Dutch Probation Service were trained in the instrument throughout 2016.
Presented and discussed in RAN meeting	<p>Presentation at RAN P&P meeting on 26 November 2015, penitentiary institute (PI) in Vught, the Netherlands.</p>
Relation to other EC initiatives	<p>None</p>
Organisation	<p>Legal entity: The Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIFP) is the Dutch centre of expertise for forensic psychiatry and psychology. It is a national service of the Ministry of Justice, incorporated in the Dutch National Agency of Correctional Institutions (DJI). The NIFP provides independent psychiatric and psychological expertise (diagnosis, care and advice) for children, juveniles and adult detainees in the Netherlands. The NIFP advises the judiciary on suspects, establishes high-quality forensic diagnostic assessments, sound and equal psychiatric care and treatment for detainees, and carries out scientific research, and education and training for professionals so that they may develop, obtain and promote professional forensic standards.</p> <p>Infrastructure: The NIFP has the expertise in developing and handling forensic datasets. The NIFP has know-how on transferring and implementing research findings into the practical field of forensic psychiatry and psychology, and professionals in prisons and probation services. Since the attack on the Dutch qQueen in 2009 and the shooting spree in a shopping centre in Alphen in 2011, expertise has been gained on extremist attacks, psychiatric autopsy and incident-handling in a public space and within the family.</p>
Country of origin	<p>The Netherlands</p>
Contact details	<p>Address: Herman Gorterstraat 5 - 3511 EW Utrecht NLD</p>

	<p>Contact persons: Dr Thomas Rinne, Dr Nils Duits Email: t.rinne@dji.minjus.nl; n.duits@dji.minjus.nl Telephone: 088 071 0240 Website: www.nifpnet.nl</p>
--	--

Radicalisation Awareness Network



2017 Edition